S9/2006 Airbus A319-111, G-EZAC
Report name:
Special Bulletin S9/2006 Airbus A319-111, G-EZAC
Special Bulletin S9/2006 Airbus A319-111, G-EZAC
Registration:
G-EZAC
G-EZAC
Type:
Airbus A319-111
Airbus A319-111
Location:
Near Nantes, France
Near Nantes, France
Date of occurrence:
15 September 2006
15 September 2006
Category:
Public transport - Fixed Wing
Public transport - Fixed Wing
Summary:
The aircraft was dispatched under the provisions of the operator’s Minimum Equipment List with the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) generator on line, substituting for the No 1 main generator which had been selected off after a fault on the previous flight had caused it to trip off line. During the cruise, the APU generator disconnected from the system, probably because of a reccurrence of the original fault. This caused the loss of a substantial number of aircraft services, including some flight instruments and all means of radio telephony (RTF) communication. Manual reconfiguration of the electrical system should have recovered many of the services but the flight crew was not able to achieve this. Since they were without RTF communications, the crew considered that the best option was to select the emergency transponder code and continue the flight in accordance with the flight plan. In the light of the initial findings of the investigation, four safety recommendations are made. The investigation is continuing.
The aircraft was dispatched under the provisions of the operator’s Minimum Equipment List with the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) generator on line, substituting for the No 1 main generator which had been selected off after a fault on the previous flight had caused it to trip off line. During the cruise, the APU generator disconnected from the system, probably because of a reccurrence of the original fault. This caused the loss of a substantial number of aircraft services, including some flight instruments and all means of radio telephony (RTF) communication. Manual reconfiguration of the electrical system should have recovered many of the services but the flight crew was not able to achieve this. Since they were without RTF communications, the crew considered that the best option was to select the emergency transponder code and continue the flight in accordance with the flight plan. In the light of the initial findings of the investigation, four safety recommendations are made. The investigation is continuing.
Download Adobe PDF reader software free from the Adobe Reader website.
Note: Users of Adobe PDF Reader version 5 (and below) may experience problems opening these PDF reports. We recommend that you upgrade to the latest version of Adobe PDF Reader by following the link above.
